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Recent Developments 
Mayor of Baltimore v. Schwing 
Overturning Waskiewicz v. General Motors Corp., 
342 Md. 699, 679 A.2d 1094 
(1996), the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that a claim under 
the Maryland Workers' 
Compensation Act arising from a 
previously existing condition was 
not barred by the five-year 
statutory period for reopening and 
modifying the award when such a 
claim was based on a new 
exposure to a workplace hazard, 
and not due solely to the natural 
progression of a previously 
existing disease. Mayor of 
Baltimore v. SchWing, 351 Md. 
178, 717 A.2d 919 (1998). 
Specifically, the court held that a 
claim based partly on new 
workplace exposures and partly on 
natural progression may be filed 
under both the workers' 
compensation occupational disease 
statute and modification statute. 
As a point of clarification, the 
court held that when the 
aggravation is due solely to a new 
disability arising from a new 
exposure, the claimant's remedy is 
governed exclusively by the 
occupational disease statute. An 
aggravation of a disease based on 
a natural progression is, however, 
governed exclusively by the 
modification statute. In reaching 
this holding, the court of appeals 
reversed its prior decision, and 
reasserted the notion that the 
Maryland's Workers' 
Compensation Act should be 
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employee. 
The statutes under Maryland's 
Workers' Compensation Act ("the 
Act") of particular concern here 
are sections 9-711 and 9-736 ofthe 
Labor and Employment Article of 
the Annotated Code of Maryland. 
Under section 9-711, if an 
employee suffers a work related 
disability, he or she must file a 
claim with the Workers' 
Compensation Commission 
("Commission") within two years 
of the disablement or when the 
employee attains actual knowledge 
that the event which caused the 
disability was work related. Under 
section 9-736, if an employee 
seeks to reopen or modify a 
previous award, the employee 
must file within five years of the 
last compensation payment. 
In December 1982, Baltimore 
City Firefighter Joseph Schwing 
("Schwing") suffered a mild heart 
attack. After a period of recovery, 
Schwing resumed his duties as a 
firefighter. In May 1983, Schwing 
filed a claim for workers' 
compensation benefits ("Claim 
A") with the Commission. 
However, as a result of a contract 
between the city and his union, 
Schwing was provided full pay and 
benefits for the entire period of 
missed work including coverage of 
his medical bills. No further 
proceedings occurred with respect 
to this claim and no benefits were 
paid through the actions of the 
Commission. Although his heart 
condition was monitored and 
treated, Schwing was able to 
resume his normal duties. 
In 1993, Schwing suffered a 
second heart attack. A subsequent 
examination revealed serious heart 
disease requiring quadruple bypass 
surgery. Surgery was performed 
and Schwing remained off work 
from December 9, 1993 through 
February 24, 1994. During this 
recovery period, Schwing received 
full salary and all medical 
expenses were covered. In March 
1994, Schwing filed a second 
claim ("Claim B") seeking 
compensation for the 
cardiovascular condition, claimed 
as an occupational disease. The 
city argued that the second heart 
attack was merely a worsening of 
the condition which began in 1982, 
and that the city was only 
29.1 U. Bait. L.F. 61 
Recent Developments 
responsible for continuing medical 
care based on Claim A. Agreeing 
with the state, the Commission 
concluded that the 1993 heart 
attack was the result of the same 
cardiovascular disease that 
disabled Schwing in 1982. In so 
concluding, the Commission 
determined that Claim B was 
beyond the two-year statute of 
limitations for such claims. 
Schwing appealed the 
Commission's decision to the 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City. 
He claimed that since he was able 
to continue his employment 
following the first heart attack, no 
prior disablement existed. As 
such, Schwing argued he was not 
barred by the two-year statute of 
limitations under section 9-711. 
The circuit court held that there 
was a disablement in 1982 and that 
Claim B was barred because it was 
not filed within two years of the 
initial disablement. However, the 
circuit court raised, sua sponte, the 
issue of Claim A and held that 
since it was timely filed in 1983, 
and no award was ever paid, it was 
not barred. As such, the circuit 
court remanded the case to the 
Commission to determine the 
benefits under Claim A to which 
Schwing may have been entitled. 
Both parties appealed to the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland. 
While the appeals were pending, 
the circuit court, contrary to its 
earlier ruling, filed a 
"Memorandum Opinion 
Addendum" and determined that 
Claim B was timely filed. 
The court of special appeals 
determined that the circuit court 
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did not have jurisdiction to 
consider Claim A and limited its 
decision to only Claim B. The 
court did note, however, that 
Schwing had suffered an earlier 
temporary total disability resulting 
from the heart attack in 1982 for 
which no compensation payments 
were made. The court analyzed 
the intent of Maryland's 
occupational disease statute and 
held that two or more separate 
compensable disabilities may 
result from the same occupational 
disease. In so holding, the court 
determined that Claim B was a 
new disability that was not barred 
by the five-year limitations period. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted certiorari to determine 
whether a claim for the 
aggravation of an earlier 
occupational disease based upon 
new InJUrIOUS exposures was 
barred by the statute of limitations 
under the Act. 
While the court of special 
appeals attempted to distinguish 
the facts at bar from those 
presented in earlier cases, the court 
of appeals began its analysis by 
squarely addressing and revisiting 
its decision in Waskiewicz. 
Schwing, 351 Md. at 194, 717 
A.2d at 927. The court noted that 
Waskiewicz barred an employee, 
who had previously claimed and 
received compensation, from 
submitting a subsequent claim for 
the same condition beyond the 
statutory period, regardless of 
whether the new claim was a result 
of a new work-related exposure. 
Id. at 196, 717 A.2d at 927-28. 
The court explained that its 
decision in Waskiewicz was simply 
wrong and that the "true answer" 
to this issue was found in the 
Waskiewicz dissent. 1d. at 197, 
717 A.2d at 928. The court, in 
discussing the Waskiewicz dissent, 
noted that its earlier decision was 
not only unsupported by other 
jurisdictions, it was contrary to the 
laws of many other states. Id. By 
citing an abundance of persuasive 
authority, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland drew support for its 
position that the holding under 
Waskiewicz was overly harsh to 
employees. Id. at 197-201, 717 
A.2d at 928-30. 
The court of appeals expanded the 
argument by discussing the 
ambiguity of the legislation. Id. at 
203, 717 A.2d at 931. The court, 
in support of the intermediate 
appellate court's analysis, found no 
reasonable basis to conclude that 
the General Assembly intended to 
bar an employee with an 
occupational disability "from 
recovering compensation for a 
subsequent disability caused by a 
subsequent exposure." Id. Such a 
holding, the court determined, 
would not only be contrary to the 
law of most other jurisdictions, it 
would be inimical to the 
"Legislature's mandate" of viewing 
workers' compensation claims 
"liberally in favor of claimants." 
Id. at 196, 717 A.2d at 928. 
In analyzing this case, the 
court compared the plain language 
argument adopted in Waskiewicz 
with the argument supporting 
statutory construction. Id. at 202-
03, 717 A.2d at 931. In the end, 
the court relied principally on 
public policy to support statutory 
construction. Id at 203, 717 A.2d 
at 931. The court explained that it 
has been a long held policy in 
Maryland for employees "disabled 
by a compensable occupational 
disease" or injury, to be "eligible 
for vocational rehabilitation 
services." Id at 203-04, 717 A.2d 
at 931. The court determined that 
it would be inconsistent with such 
a practice to bar a worker's 
compensation claim based on the 
worsening of a previously claimed 
condition when the subsequent 
claim is not a result of the natural 
progression of the condition. Id. at 
206-07, 717 A.2d at 933. In so 
determining, the court held that a 
new claim under the Act arising 
from a previously existing 
condition is not barred by the five-
year statutory time limitation for 
reopening and modifying the 
award, provided the claim is the 
result of exposure to a new 
workplace hazard and is not due 
solely to the natural progression of 
the previously existing condition. 
Id at 205-06, 717 A.2d at 932-33. 
Concurring with the majority's 
judgment, Judge Raker, joined by 
Judge Rodowsky, would affirm the 
court of special appeals, yet leave 
intact the holding of Waskiewicz. 
Id at 208, 717 A.2d at 933-34. 
Judge Raker explained that the 
doctrine of stare decisis is such a 
fundamental principle that prior 
holdings should be disturbed only 
as a last resort, and that the facts at 
bar could be distinguished from 
Waskiewicz. Id. at 209, 717 A.2d 
at 934. As such, Judge Raker 
suggested that the court of appeals 
should refrain from judicial 
activism and stated that if the 
legislature wanted to change the 
law, it would have done so. Id. at 
215-16, 717 A.2d at 937-38. 
In Mayor of Baltimore v. 
Schwing, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland lifted from the claimant 
the burden of filing an original or 
modifying claim within certain 
inequitable statutorily prescribed 
periods when the claimant has 
been exposed to additional 
workplace hazards. This case 
demonstrates the flexibility 
inherent in the judicial process, 
and provides a good example of 
when such flexibility should 
manifest. Although the courts 
should refrain from judicial 
activism, allowing unjust decisions 
based on what may reasonably be 
perceived as an oversight by the 
legislature would be a dereliction 
of duty. Considering the current 
composition of the court of 
appeals, such a holding will 
predictably remain the law in 
Maryland for many years to come. 
Less predictable, however, will be 
the response of the General 
Assembly. 
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